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Abstract—In this paper, we suggest the idea of separately
treating the connectivity and communication model of a
Wireless Sensor Network (WSN). We then propose a novel
connectivity model for a WSN using first order Reed-Muller
Codes. While the model has a hierarchical structure, we have
shown that it works equally well for a Distributed WSN.
Though one can use any communication model, we prefer to
use the communication model suggested by Ruj and Roy [1] for
all computations and results in our work. Two suitable secure
(symmetric) cryptosystems can then be applied for the two
different models, connectivity and communication respectively.
By doing so we have shown how resiliency and scalability are
appreciably improved as compared to Ruj and Roy [1].
Keywords-Security, Connectivity, Reed-Muller Codes, Com-
munication, Reed-Solomon Codes.
I. INTRODUCTION
Two of the most popular ad hoc networks are Mobile Ad
Hoc Networks (MANET) and Sensor Networks. Here we
will deal with Wireless Sensor Networks (WSN), where the
sensors use radio frequencies to communicate.
WSN has several military applications such as the col-
lection of information about enemy movements, explosions
and detecting and characterizing chemical, biological, radi-
ological, nuclear and explosive (CBRNE) materials. On the
other hand, detecting and monitoring environmental changes
in plains, forests, etc, to monitor vehicle traffic on highways
or in congested parts of a city are some of the important
civilian uses of WSN.
A WSN consists of a large number of sensor nodes with
limited power, computational, storage and communicational
capabilities which are generally deployed in a very dense
fashion. A sensor node typically consists of a power unit, a
storage unit and a wireless transceiver. Other than the sensors
being resource constrained, the WSN is faced with some
more disadvantages. For example, the sensor nodes can fail
or be easily captured and the network topology may keep
on changing.
These facts make secure communication difficult and
hence there is scope for more study to increase the security
of communication in a WSN. Constrained resources of
the sensors implies that we will have to use a private
key cryptosystem instead of a public key cryptosystem.
Inability to use a secure channel for key distribution during
communication implies that keys need to be pre-distributed
(i.e., keys are uploaded in the nodes prior to deployment)
and key establishment has to be done prior to sending
any message. One such key establishment method has been
suggested by Ruj and Roy [1] using Reed-Solomon codes.
In this paper we first prose the idea of trating connectivity
and communication of a WSN as two different concepts.
Now using 1st order Reed-Muller codes, we propose a novel
connectivity model for WSN. This enables us to enhance the
security of communication of a WSN.
A. Related Works
A random key pre-distribution scheme was proposed by
Eschemauer & Gligor [2], where keys are drawn randomly
from a key pool and placed in sensors prior to deployment.
The work [3] provides an extended survey of different pre
key-distribution schemes for Distributed Sensor Networks.
Two deployed nodes, which are willing to communicate
between themselves, must discover a secret common key and
this phase is termed “shared key discovery”. In the case of
the absence of any common key a path has to be followed to
establish a common key between those nodes. This phase is
referred to as “path key establishment”. Lee & Stinson [4]
and Ruj & Roy [5] showed that deterministic designs have
the advantage of efficient shared key discovery and path key
establishment.
A code-based key management system was proposed
by Al-Shurman and Yoo [6], where matrices have been
used along with a random vector to generate a codeword
which is the secret key chain. With certain probabilities the
design satisfies Cover-free-family (CFF). However, neither
the problem of connectivity in a network nor the scenario
of node compromise is addressed.
In [1], Roy and Ruj have proposed a scheme where the
node identifiers are transmitted through wireless channels.
Corresponding to each node identifier there is a unique
polynomial. When two nodes try to find their common key
identifiers and hence their common keys, they equate their
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respective polynomials. Here we note that an attacker may
try to compute a (captured) node’s polynomial and equate it
to some other node’s polynomial to obtain the common key
identifiers, should there be any. Also, by directly solving
the polynomials, key identifiers are revealed enabling the
attacker to decide precisely which of the nodes should be
attacked to get a particular key needed for decrypting a
particular message. Thus selective attack is actually possible
from the key establishment stage onwards.
B. Our Contributions
We try to address the problem above, by differentiating
between connectivity and communication of a network. The
deployment of the sensor nodes can be achieved according to
our connectivity model in a controlled WSN and one can use
this knowledge of deployment to establish the connectivity
model on an uncontrolled WSN.
We then use a security protocol in our connectivity model
which encrypts the node identifier that is broadcast, ensuring
that only the intended recipients are able to decrypt it. Here
the advantage is that in case of node capture, all the stored
keys and the corresponding key identifiers are exposed, but,
to find out which of the uncompromised nodes share these
keys, one has to successfully decrypt the node identifier.
We shall show how we can modify our model to fit into
a Distributed Wireless Sensor Network (DWSN). The only
requirement is that we have to plug in O(Nt ) many nodes
(N and t are defined in the next section) which will act as
Cluster Heads (CH) and these nodes need to be made more
secure. With this assumption we shall show that our system
provides much improved security compared to [1].
The connectivity model presented here uses a path con-
nected graph. For communication (direct/indirect) between
two nodes, a path between them is required but not vice
versa.
II. BASIC CONCEPTS, DEFINITIONS AND NOTATION
• Radius of communication: This is the maximum dis-
tance, r, of transmitting and receiving radio frequencies
for each node. Different nodes might have different
radii of communication. For instance, in a hierarchical
WSN, the sensor nodes may have lesser value of r as
compared to CHs.
• Communication and Connectivity keys: Our model has
two aspects, viz. communication and connectivity, for
which we use two different cryptosystems and hence
two different sets of keys. Communication keys are pre-
distributed and our target is to make key establishment
secure. To achieve this, we make use of connectivity
keys. Here, since we are dealing with fewer nodes in
each cluster of the hierarchical system, one can employ
group key distribution or group key agreement schemes.
Such schemes have been described in page 3 of [7].
• Connectivity: Two nodes, or CHs, or a node and
a CH are said to be connected if they are in the
communication radius of each other and share at least
one secure connectivity key. Please note that we are
differentiating between the security keys of connection
and communication.
• Connectivity model of a network: Connectivity model
of a network is a graphical representation depicting how
the nodes are connected to each other in terms of trans-
mitting/receiving radio frequencies, infrared and optical
frequencies etc. A matrix design will be discussed in
detail in section IV.
• Node Communication: Two nodes can communicate if
there is a path between them in the graphical represen-
tation of the connectivity model and they share at least
one communication key.
• Notations Used: N - total number of nodes.
N ′ - total number of sensor nodes + Cluster Heads.
n - number of keys in the key ring of each node.
t - number of nodes per cluster in the connectivity
model.
a - denotes least integer ≥ the given real number a.
Reed-Muller (r, qrm): r - degree of the Reed-Muller
code & qrm - a prime power.
Fqrm - field over which Reed-Muller vectors are
defined.
Reed-Solomon (k, qrs): k - degree of the Reed-Muller
code & qrs - a prime power.
Other than this we will use some notions related to the
resiliency of our model. They will be defined as required.
III. MODELS OF THE SYSTEM
Our hierarchical system has two aspects regarding con-
nectivity and communication.
A. Connectivity model:
In this paper we concentrate on the connectivity aspect
for which we use first order Reed-Muller codes. The details
will be explained in section IV.
B. Communication model:
While calculating the resiliency we need to use some
communication model. Though any existing model can be
chosen, we have opted for the model suggested by Ruj and
Roy [1] where Reed-Solomon codes have been utilized for
key pre-distribution. Indeed, we have been able to obtain
theoretically better results in terms of security and resiliency.
Our model is also scalable.
Also in Ruj and Roy [1] two communicating nodes had
to be in the radius of communication of each other and
share at least one secret key. However in our case all that is
required is for them to have at least one communication
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key in common. In case they are not in the radius of
communication of each other, multi-hop communication,
with the help of cluster heads may be accomplished to
obtain a secure communication. Since the CHs are much
powerful units and only O(Nt ) (extra) CHs are required
(see Theorem 4, Section VI), the communication overhead
remains unaffected.
IV. CONNECTIVITY MODEL
We would like to refer to [9] for an elaborate description
of first order Reed-Muller codes. Baring a few minor no-
tational changes we shall use them as described in [9] to
develop our connectivity model. The changes required for
us are as follows:
The variable xi in our model is same as the variable
xm−i [9], where m is the number of variables. In our case,
the vector associated with our monomial xi has 2i−1 ones,
followed by 2i−1 zeros and so on, where 1 ≤ i ≤ m. For
example, in a space of size 22,i.e. with m = 2 the vector as-
sociated with x2 is (1100). Again in a space with m = 3, the
vector associated with the monomial x3x2x1 can be found
by multiplying (11110000)∗(11001100)∗(10101010) which
gives (10000000). Addition of x3 & x2 yields (00111100).
In our connectivity model, we use matrices of the form:
⎡
⎢⎢⎣
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
x1 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0
x2 1 1 0 0 1 1 0 0
x3 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0
⎤
⎥⎥⎦
as our connectivity matrix. The above has been denoted as
R(1; 3) in [9]. Here 1 means degree of monomial is 1 and
3 means number of variable is 3.
Each node in the cluster, including the cluster head, is
assigned a vector corresponding to a variable. In each vector
of the given vector space defined over F2, a 1 implies
connectivity link is present and 0 implies no connection is
present. Thus if two nodes have a 1 in the ith position, then
they are connected by a connectivity link, i.e., they share a
common frequency channel that can be made secure by use
of secure connectivity keys.
1 is assigned to the Cluster Head and x1, x2 and x3 to
the nodes under that cluster head.
The 1st column has all 1s for all the nodes, this provides
a broadcast channel for that cluster. This can be used for
Traitor-tracing or for key distribution or pre-distribution
when a node or cluster head is captured, as explained later.
A. Hierarchy based Model
In this section we present the most generalized form of our
model which is meant for a hierarchy-based wireless sensor
network. In the following diagram President (P) acts as the
group head or cluster head (CH) which is often termed as
the KDS (Key Distribution Server). Army (A), Navy (N) and
Air-force (F) are three nodes in this group or cluster. We also
make a provision for some other Head(s) of a General public
body (G) to be brought later into this cluster (see Figure.1).
Figure 1. A typical Hierarchical system with one KDS and four nodes
For such a model we use the following connectivity matrix.
Here a − p are various connectivity channels which make
use of different connectivity keys although they may or may
not use same radio frequencies.
⎡
⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎣
a b c d e f g h i j k l m n o p
P 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
A 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0
N 1 1 0 0 1 1 0 0 1 1 0 0 1 1 0 0
F 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0
G 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
⎤
⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎦
In the above matrix representation, all the four nodes are
connected to each other in various possible ways. The KDS
or President is present in all connection which is desirable
as it is the supreme authority. It should be noted that any
node can communicate with the President via an exclusive
channel shared between the two and no other. Clearly there
is a channel shared between any two of the nodes and the
President, a channel for three out of the four nodes and the
President and also one channel for all four to communicate
with the President. Since all these nodes can have high
computing power and need to deal with sensitive data, we
can make use of either symmetric or public key encryption
at this level.
Naturally, the hierarchy consists of heterogeneous nodes,
with the nodes lower down having greater resource con-
straints. Depending on the capability of the nodes and the
sensitivity of message we provide a suitable cryptosystem.
All these CHs are thus treated as “trusted” since they can
be provided with more security than ordinary nodes. This is
generally achievable as the number of cluster heads is much
less compared to ordinary nodes. We prove in section VII
(Theorem 4) that the number of CHs = O(Nt ).
B. Particular Case of Distributed Sensor Network (DWSN)
Since in a sensor network the communication and the
connection model is normally a pair-wise locally-complete
graph, that is, where any subset of two local (i.e., neigh-
bouring) nodes can be allowed to communicate, we modify
the Reed-Muller matrix accordingly.
⎡
⎢⎢⎢⎢⎣
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
x1 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0
x2 1 1 0 0 1 1 0 0 1 1 0 0 1 1 0 0
x3 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0
x4 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
⎤
⎥⎥⎥⎥⎦
Here, the columns 2, 3, 5 and 9 represent connection
links connecting three nodes. Hence in a pair-wise locally
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connected network we can safely replace these columns
with 0s resulting in the following connectivity matrix. Also
the top-most cluster head associated with variable 1 has
authority over all connections. This condition can be relaxed
as follows: the top most cluster head may share only one
connectivity link with each of the t nodes under it. Hence
the connectivity matrix becomes:
⎡
⎢⎢⎢⎢⎣
1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 1 1 0
x1 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 1 0
x2 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 1 0 0
x3 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 0
x4 1 0 0 1 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
⎤
⎥⎥⎥⎥⎦
Remark: The versatility of Reed-Muller is in its use for
locally r-complete systems, where r ≤ t & t ≥ 2 (see [7]).
C. Node addition
When a node needs to be added to a cluster of i pre-
existing nodes, then the following changes need to be made
to the connectivity matrix (see Figure 2). The dimension of
the vector corresponding to each node is doubled, and for
each of the pre-existing nodes the bit-pattern is duplicated
and padded to the right. The new node to be added is as-
signed a new variable xi+1, which has the Least Significant
Half (LSH) as all 0s and the most significant half assigned
with 0s and 1s to represent connectivity with the pre-existing
nodes. Furthermore, in those places in the most significant
half of the variable xi+1 , where there is a 0, it is equivalent
to the connection pattern among the pre-existing nodes being
duplicated by alternate routes. Hence these columns can be
safely made all 0s, without affecting network connectivity.
Figure 2. Generalized matrix for DWSN with four nodes
V. VARIOUS NETWORK PARAMETERS
Here we discuss the various network parameters and
highlight some of the improvements achieved.
A. Communication probability of the network
The communication probability of the network is defined
to be the probability that two nodes can communicate
with each other, i.e., the probability that there exists a
communication key between them. Mathematically, we have
ρc =
Number of communication link present in networks
Total number of possible links
Theorem 1: ρc is independent of connectivity.
Proof: It is evident from our proposed model that each CH
or node is connected to its sibling, its children (if any) and
its parents (if any). So when it wants to send a message to
any of them it does so directly. Otherwise, if it has to send
to any node outside its cluster, it uses its CH or one of its
children. Hence the communication is not dependent on the
connectivity of the network as it is connected by some path
to all the nodes in the network. The theorem follows.
B. Resilience:
Here we assume that we have a hypothetical intrusion de-
tection (i.e. attack detection) mechanism to inform the KDS
and subsequent nodes of the compromised node. When a
node, say X1, is captured, the keys that are compromised are
the broadcast key, the keys between X1 and the remaining
nodes in that cluster and the key shared by its cluster head
and X1 exclusively, but it does not contribute to resilience.
One important characteristic of the use of the Reed-Muller
code is that it ensures that, even after deleting all the above
keys, the remaining nodes still remain connected with each
other and hence can safely carry out communication along
alternate direct or multi-hop links. As soon as the capture
of X1 is detected by other nodes through the broadcast
channel they delete all the keys that they shared with
the compromised node X1, which amounts to making the
corresponding columns all 0s. Thus, the table now becomes:
Figure 3. Changes in Matrix when one node (X1) is compromised
Now consider the resilience due to the capture of a newly
added node Xm+1, in a pre-existing system consisting of
X1, X2, . . . , Xm. Since Xm+1 does not contain the older
set of 2m keys (remember it has all 0s in the LSH), hence
the capture of Xm+1 does not affect any of the pre-existing
nodes which can still communicate using the older keys.
We now calculate some of the resilience coefficients.
Calculation of V (s) : Vs =
dn,ch(s,t)
N ′ , where dn,ch(s, t) =
Number of uncompromised sensor nodes disconnected due
to capture of s node and t cluster heads.
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We break the V (s) calculation into 3 parts.
Vnode(s) =
dn(s)
N ′ , where dn(s) or dn,ch(s, 0) = Uncom-
promised sensor nodes disconnected due to s node capture.
Vch(t) =
dch(t)
N ′ , where dch(t) dn,ch(0, t)= Uncompro-
mised sensor nodes disconnected due to t cluster heads
(CHs) capture & finally Vnode,ch(s, t) =
dn,ch(s,t)
N ′ , where
dn,ch(s1, s2) = Number of uncompromised sensor nodes
disconnected due to capture of s1 node & s2 CHs.
Theorem 2: During key establishment when node id’s are
broadcast, (i) Vnode(s) = 0 when s < n, (ii) Vnode(s) ≤
N ′−nq
N ′ . when s = n and (iii) Vnode(s) ≤ NN ′ when s > n.
After broadcast Vnode(s) = 0.
Proof: For capture of simple sensor node (s = 1), all keys
in its key ring, all its key identifiers and its node IDs ARE
compromised. However nodes which are not communicating
are not affected. Thus none of the uncompromised nodes are
disconnected. Also no new key ring can be formed for s < n.
Thus (i) follows
For s ≥ n, we would like to refer our readers to the section
6.3: Analysis of V(s) of Roy and Ruj [1].
As has been noted earlier, unlike Roy and Ruj [1], an
attacker cannot gain much information by listening to our
connectivity channel. The encrypted node identifiers are
passed only during broadcast in our system. So an attacker
does not get the node IDs directly. Thus, unless physical
capture of any node takes place, the attacker cannot obtain
any extra information.
Also, after key establishment, the node IDs obtained from
the other nodes should be deleted from the node’s and
the Cluster Head’s memory. Even if the attacker captures
adequate number of nodes, he cannot predict the communi-
cations of any other node due to a lack of node IDs of those
nodes. Hence the theorem follows.
Theorem 3: Vch(s) = 0.
Proof: When a single CH is captured, i.e., when s = 1,
the attacker can observe the communications being carried
through this Cluster Head. During key establishment, when
all the node IDs are broadcast in encrypted fashion, this
cluster head can decrypt it and find the polynomials which
can be solved to obtain the key identifiers of the keys
that will be used for the communication for each node.
However unless the communicating sensor node is captured
the attacker cannot find out the key to which this key
identifier maps. Thus he can only have some partial idea
of communication between various nodes which is not
sufficient. Hence Vch(1) = 0 in this case. Generalizing we
have Vch(s) = 0 during key establishment.
Post key establishment, the compromise of a Cluster Head
gives the attacker no extra information, as the node IDs are
no longer transmitted. The result follows.
Corollary 1: Vnode,ch(s1, s2) = Vnode(s1). That is
Vnode,ch(s1, s2) is independent of CH capture.
Proof: From the proof of Theorem 3, it is clear that the
capture of any number of Cluster heads yields the key
identifiers of all the nodes. But this knowledge is of no use
unless a node is captured, hence the conclusion.
Remarks:
• The node identifiers are to be transmitted only once
when key establishment takes place and this process is
assumed to be very fast and secure. In the later stages,
when the massage is to be sent, the sender encrypts
it before sending and only the recipient can decrypt it
using communication keys.
• The process of sending the message can be performed
using the global IP address which the nodes can
broadcast in the key establishment phase. Thus we can
avoid repeatedly sending the node identifier and hence
repeated decryption encryption at the Cluster Head.
• In case one wants to avoid the use of global ID, then
the node ID has to be broadcast at every step. However,
it remains that at least n nodes are to be captured to
affect other nodes. Whereas in Ruj and Roy [1] the
attacker gains much information by listening only to the
communication channel. Clearly, even in this respect
our model is much secure as no extra informationed is
gained from the channel.
Alternative Communication Approach:
Alternatively, if we remodel the system in such a way
that during communication key establishment, when the
broadcasted node ID reaches the parent CH of the recipient
sensor node, it does the polynomial evaluation of the
broadcast node ID and the recipient node ID to find out
the common key IDs, if any. Next, it securely transmits
the IDs of the common keys to the recipient node. Thus,
even if a sensor node is captured before key establishment,
the attacker can only find out which node shares a key
with the said compromised node. But he does not gain any
information about the key ring of the other communicating
nodes. Hence the capture of a node does not affect the
communication among the other communicating parties.
Also in the event of capture of a Cluster Head, security is
not breached (since actual keys are still not revealed). Thus
Vch(s) = 0 & Vnode(s) = 0 for this improved system.
Calculation of Econ : Econ(s) = clbrkclbc , where clbrk
= number of connectivity links broken due to capture
of s nodes or cluster heads and clbc = total number of
connectivity links present before capture. Since this concept
is more related to communication, we give a brief outline
of the following major issues needed for our model:-
1) Capture of a simple node at the lowest level: Consider
there are t nodes in the cluster, one of which gets captured.
When the node is captured, the connection link with its
parent CH, the t − 1 connection with the t − 1 siblings in
its cluster and the broadcast channel used by nodes in that
cluster are broken. Thus a total of t + 1 links which were
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connected to the captured node are broken. The remaining
links remain unaffected.
2) Capture of a Cluster Head: After key-establishment, if
a CH is captured, all links through it are affected, however
the resiliency of the system is unaffected. It is clear that
now messasges pass through it in an encrypted fashion.
During the broadcast of keys, in the unlikely event of a
CH compromise, the situation is more complicated. Here
we have to make provision for some extra (buffer) CHs at
each level. These Buffer CHs will be empowered to replace
any CH and distribute fresh keys.
C. Scalability
Our model is scalable in the sense that any number of
nodes can enter the network resulting in a possible increase
in the number of tier with the qrm fixed or choosing a higher
value. Also the new nodes can be given connectivity key by
rotation policy and use different frequency. Communication
protocol will then dictate its communication keys.
VI. SECURITY, CLUSTER HEAD ESTIMATE: CAPACITY
The connectivity model is determined in the pre-
deployment phase. The wireless channels for connection can
be made secure by using pre-deployed connectivity keys.
Thus in our system the key ring is never sent over the
open channel. We have also noted that the CHs play a
very important role in the resiliency of the model. Thus it
becomes necessary to have an estimate of the number of
CHs and their storage capacity.
Theorem 4: Number of CH ∼ O(Nt ), where t ≤ n2 .
Proof: If there be t-children at level for each CH, then
baring the KDS, each CH will have 2t connections (1 for
its own CH, t − 1 at its level and t children). Now if we
restrict the connection to be n, i.e. ≤ the communication
keys per node, we have have t ≤ n/2. It can easily be seen
that at the level just above the lowermost level, there are
N/t CHs. At the level above it there are N/t2 CHs and
so on. Now as the height of the tree is logN , number of
CH= N ·
[∑r+1
i=1
(
1
t2
)] ∼ 0 (Nt
)
. Hence the result.
Remark: Baring the KDS, each CH will have 2t connec-
tions (1 for its own CH, t−1 at its level and t children). Now
if we are compelled to restrict the connection to be n (due
to resource constraint), i.e., ≤ the communication keys per
node, we must have t ≤ n/2. Our model can also support
variable number of nodes in various clusters. That is we
can introduce Cluster Heads (CHs) with different capabilities
and their number is determined by the situation.
VII. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
In this paper, firstly, we have differentiated between the
connectivity and the communication of a Wireless Sensor
Network. Then, to make the communication more secure,
we have used cryptographic techniques in the connectivity
models. We would also like to highlight that our connectivity
model is based on a first order Reed-Muller code.
Though one can use any communication model, we have
based our calculations on the model proposed by Ruj and
Roy in [1]. However compared to them or Lee and Stinson’s
scheme of key pre-distribution [4], our resiliency is appre-
ciably improved. As observed, the system is also scalable.
There is scope for further developments in this direction.
For example, in the current model, repeated enciphering
and deciphering is being done at each CH in between two
communicating nodes of different clusters. It may be an
improvement to develop a system to avoid this. To this end,
it may be fascinating to see if one can apply any coding or
other techniques. Moreover, in Ruj and Roy [1] each key is
shared amongst qk−1 nodes, where qk−1 ≤ N ≤ qk & q−
a prime power. Codes may also be used in seeking a better
system in which less number of nodes share the same key
and still the system is scalable with improved resiliency.
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